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Abstract
BLAUSTEIN, DANIELLE

ELECTION ADMINISTRATION: THE EFFECT OF RACE
ON ELECTION TECHNOLOGY IMPLEMENTATION AND
ADVANCEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

ADVISOR: Mark Dallas
A necessary condition for democracy is the ability for citizens to be heard. The way by
which this is done is through electing officials that represent a diverse set of beliefs and values.
The mechanism by doing this is through elections. At a quick glance, elections appear to play a
minor role in democracy. But in fact, the foundations of elections are essential to our
understanding of American democracy. It is assumed that the implementation of an electoral
system is sufficient for American democracy. Diving deeper into the complexities of election
systems provides evidence for benchmarks that prevent elections from representing democratic
values. It holds true that elected officials rely on democratic elections to legitimize their role in
government. Perceptions of democracy are in fact affected by the fragilities of the electoral
process. When it all goes right, democracy appears to be protected to the perspective of citizens.
The odds of an election going off without a hitch is one in a million. The aspects of elections that
are most worrisome to experts as well as the public are accuracy and reliability. Past elections
have shown that accuracy and reliability are issues of election technology and the failure of these
aspects puts the United States’ democratic processes at risk. I argue that as of today, election
officials and scholars are at a tossup. They cannot foresee any way to advance technology
without risking or compromising on the accuracy and reliability of elections. This poses
significant challenges because for elections to be accessible to all, technological advances are
needed to accommodate those with disabilities, the elderly, and the fact that voters are busy and
expect an easy, seamless process when they reach the polls. There are many factors that affect
the implementation and advancement of voting technology. Previous research has provided
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evidence that the racial composition of counties affect the ability of election administrations to
advance to new technologies. This thesis aims to further explore the issues of election
technology and their role in defining democracy by analyzing different aspects of election
administration and by focusing the role race plays in the advancement of voting technology.
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Chapter One: Introduction
A citizen’s right to vote is essential to the democratic function of the United States
government. The ability of citizens to indicate their preferences on election day, and perceiving
that their vote means something, allows for elected officials to represent a diverse set of beliefs
and values. This perception held by American citizens is unsound. The infrastructure of elections
allows for a schizophrenic understanding of the electoral process held by citizens. I would know.
Before becoming an intern at the Suffolk County Board of Elections, I held many of the same
views that other voters held about elections. We, as Americans, see elections as a seamless,
perfect process. You register to vote and on election day, you go to your designated polling
place, cast your ballot and leave. You leave with the sentiment that your vote counts and your
voice was heard. Perceptions of democracy are in fact affected by the fragilities of the electoral
process. If there were problems that arose on election day, the media would report it causing
public concern. What is lost in translation is that election day is a snapshot of the entire electoral
process and that the most fragile aspect of this process is not what is seen on election day- the
implementation of voting technologies. Voters use voting machines that are prepared for them.
They do not know what occurs behind the scenes that allows for these machines to operate the
way they do on election day.
In this chapter, I will bring attention to the history of election technology and its
relevance to today’s challenges faced by election administrations, explore the current standards
and statutes related to election technology, as well as examine how federalism plays an important
role in the implementation of voting technology at all levels of government. I seek to establish
that elections are in fact political. The issues that are taken on by federal, state and local
governments are impacted by the political influences and forces that affect decision making and
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technological advancement. The field of election technology is an overlooked area of study. This
is noteworthy to bring attention to because this area of study is essential to the development and
continuance of democracy. If it isn’t a high-ranking concern to officials and scholars, then there
is a risk that democracy will be undermined. This is a risk that Americans shouldn’t be willing to
take. Recent elections have brought the topic of election technology to the forefront of election
administration issues, precisely noting the challenges with accuracy and reliability. These issues
have become widely known to the public and are a topic of robust conversation. The fact that
many see election technology as a great concern is enough for governments, scholars, and
organizations to want to dedicate time and resources.
1.1 History of Election Technology
Election technology has been implemented in the election process since the beginning of
elections in the United States. The exact method of election technology used in elections has
advanced, but not without hesitation and concern from election officials, elected officials, and
scholars. These concerns mainly surround accuracy, reliability, and security. With each
advancement there is an associated risk of threatening the stability of the function of elections
and it does not always contribute to better voting systems. Along with this concern, there are
other factors that play a role in the advancement of voting technology in the general sense and in
terms of what technology each jurisdiction chooses to use.
Elections have made a considerable amount of advancement since the first known
elections. In the early 1700s, there was no modern technology available to assist in the inputting
and tabulation of voters’ preferences. The method election officials used involved sitting at a
central location with a judge and other election officials and have citizens outwardly voice their
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preferences to the clerk and the judge.1 This method of collecting votes goes against the many
conventions that are known today. For example, there were no ballots, ballot boxes, or a right to
cast your vote secretly.2 This means that there was no way to audit or have any record to show
the number of votes for each candidate. There is a possibility that these aspects of election
procedure were not an important issue back then. Historically, the advancement of election
procedure is somewhat related to historical periods. What is meant by this is that the historical
context can help explain the circumstances associated with how the voting process was
instituted. This sections relies heavily on the work of Douglas Jones, who is credited with
outlining the historical account of voting technology.
The first ballots or method of expressing voter choice in a tangible manner was outside of
the United States. In Ancient Greece, voters were given a token and would place it in a clay box
expressing their preference.3 The token and ballot box method is the first documented voting
technology. This should be prefaced with a clear definition of what constitutes a voting
technology. A voting technology is characterized as any method (technical or not) that
contributes to the translation of voter intent to something that can be counted. The first ballots
are a clear example of this definition. Although clay tokens are not what is thought of a
conventional technology, it shows that technology can be created and utilized in different ways.
When analyzing voting technology, it is important to keep this context in mind.
Paper ballots were a prominent voting technology in United States during the late 1600s.4
This type of technology is a staple in the voting process and this technology is not going to be

1

Jones, Douglas W., “A Brief Illustrated History of Voting”, Voting and Elections Web Pages, The University of
Iowa Department of Computer Science, 3/12/21.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
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phased out in the near future. Paper ballots provide a paper trail, allowing records of voter intent
to be created. The Constitution addresses the use of ballots in the 12th amendment. Jones states,
By the time the 12th Amendment to the United States Constitution was passed, it was
clear that the term ballot was routinely taken to refer to a slip of paper on which were
written the names of candidates for office. The very fact that the 12th amendment requires
the use of separate ballots to elect a President and Vice-President implies that the use of
one ballot to elect candidates to more than one office was understood at the time.5
The notion that the 12th amendment, which was passed in 1789, conceptualizes the fact
that a paper ballot would be used to indicate vote preference. Paper ballots paved the way for
newer, more advanced technology to be created. Many voting technologies operate off of paper
ballots. For example, current voting machines collect paper ballots that contain the voter’s
preference. At first, voters would bring a blank sheet of paper to where they voted.6 The blank
sheet of paper upgraded to a preprinted ballot with each candidate named.7 These ballots were
provided by political parties and the candidates themselves.8 It is noteworthy to bring attention to
this particular advancement because it foreshadows the many advancements that occur later in
history and how such advancement within one technology can revolutionize the voting process.
In 1838, there was an urgent request for a secret ballot in London, England. A secret
ballot prevents voter intent from being revealed to those counting the votes or to those who see
the ballots after the vote is tabulated. The secret ballot in London was a ball that would be placed
in a hole that represented the voter’s preference.9 By dropping a ball that was the exact same as
every other ball, the votes were indistinguishable from each other. The secret ballot is a core
manifestation of democracy. In a democracy, there should be no pressure to vote in a particular

5

Ibid.
Ibid.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid.
6
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way. By ensuring that voter intent is not exposed during the process, citizens are protected from
any one or any institution from preventing that choice to be made.
The interest of using a private ballot was held by Australians as well. In turn, Australia is
credited with creating the Australian Paper Ballot in the 1800s. This type of ballot was
implemented in the United States in 1888.10 The Australian Paper Ballot is a standard ballot that
is printed and distributed by the government to voters.11 The United States did not implement the
Australian ballot type all at once, it was done at the state’s discretion. Some states like New York
and Massachusetts were the first to implement these ballots.12 Issues with security and fraud
arose in previous elections which lead to this shift.13 This antiquated technology appears to be a
less integral part of the voting process, but led to further technological advancement.
In a similar manner, lever voting machines are categorized as another major
advancement in voting technology. The MIT Election Lab provides a well-written explanation of
how this technology functions:
Lever machines are operated by the voter indicating his or her choice by depressing a
lever next to the preferred candidate. When the voter enters the voting machine, he or she
pulls a large lever that pulls a curtain around the voter, ensuring privacy. There is an
interlocking mechanism in the machine that prevents the voter from over-voting—that is,
voting for more than the allowed number of candidates. Once the voter is finished, the
voter pulls the large lever again, which causes the counters associated with his or her
choices to be incremented by one and the machine prepared for the next voter. At the end
of Election Day, votes are counted by opening the machine and reading the numbers on
the counters associated with all the candidates. By law, mechanical lever machines may
no longer be used in federal elections, although they're sometimes still used in state and
local elections.14

10

Ibid.
Ibid.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid.
14
Voting Technology MIT Election Lab , https://electionlab.mit.edu/research/voting-technology, 3/12/21
11
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Lever voting machines were first used in 1892, but took much longer to implement this
technology across the United States.15 During this time period, lever voting machines were a
considered an advanced technology. Jones states,
Lever voting machines were so pervasive by the mid 20th century that most of us born in
midcentury grew up assuming that all voting machines would always be lever machines.
Today, although they have been out of production since 1982, these machines are still in
extremely widespread use. They completely eliminate most of the approaches to
manipulating the vote count that were endemic a century ago, and they can easily be
configured to handle a complex general election ballot.16

Figure 1.1 Illustration of a lever voting machine submitted for
patent
Source: Jones, Douglas W., A Brief Illustrated History of Voting,

This perspective illuminates a number of different concerns relating to the advancement of
election technology. The notion that lever machines were in widespread use in 2001 is alarming.
The Brennen Center of Justice states that election technology should be replaced after ten years

15

Jones, Douglas W., “A Brief Illustrated History of Voting”, Voting and Elections Web Pages, The University of
Iowa Department of Computer Science, 3/12/21.
16
Ibid.
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in use and that the technology won’t be reliable after 20 years.17 Lever machines were at risk of
being unreliable, but many jurisdictions still depend on them. This perspective also alludes to the
voter comfort level with this specific type of voting technology. In terms of its usage, lever
machines were easy to understand and use, which made it less likely that voters’ preferences
were demonstrated incorrectly.
Punch Card Voting Machines are a voting technology that was adapted from another use.
Punch card voting systems were first created to catalogue and run statistics for the Baltimore
Board of Health and for other tabulations across many different fields.18 The punch card system
works as indicated by the following description:
In the most common version of the punch-card machine, a blank pre-scored card is
inserted into a holder. The holder contains a ballot and a set of targets associating each
choice with a punch position on the card. If a voter wants to vote for a candidate, he or
she uses a stylus to dislodge a chad (the pre-scored bit of paper) and create a hole in the
card associated with the candidate’s number. When the voter is done, he or she takes the
ballot card and deposits it in a ballot box. At the end of Election Day, the ballots are
counted using a card reader, usually in the central election office.19
IBM is credited with creating the punch card system used for voting, but abandoned the system
in 1969 due to well-known technology issues.20 The technology of this voting system was
complex and used by many election jurisdictions. There were two punch card voting systems that
were of wide use: IBM’s Votomatic system and Election Data Corporation’s Data-Punch
system.21 From a historical perspective, this is the first instance that two private companies were
in competition with each other, providing jurisdictions with the opportunity to choose between
two different options. As a result, there was more variability in the voting process. A positive

17

Norden and Famighetti, “America’s Voting machines at Risk”,4
Ibid.
19
Voting Technology, MIT Election Lab, , https://electionlab.mit.edu/research/voting-technology, 3/12/21
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
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consequences is that there was more access to this type of machine for all jurisdictions to
purchase and use.
Optical Mark-Sense scanners are similar to punch card voting systems in the sense that
this technology had other uses before being adapted to help administer elections. Optical
scanners were created by IBM to be used to grade the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT).22
Furthermore, Mark-Sense Optical Scanners were created for a similar standardized test, the
ACT.23 Optical scanners were first used in California in 1962.24 This technology worked as
explained below:
Optical Scan Paper Ballot Systems include both marksense and digital image scanners in
which voters mark paper ballots that are subsequently tabulated by scanning devices. On
most optical scan ballots voters indicate their selections by filling in an oval, completing
an arrow or filling in a box. Ballots may be either scanned on hand-fed optical scan
tabulators in the polling place or vote center (Precinct Count) or collected in a ballot box
to be scanned at a central location (Central Count.) High capacity batch-fed optical scan
tabulators are used in some jurisdictions to handle larger volumes of central count ballots.
Optical scan voting systems can scan and tabulate ballots marked by hand or those
marked by a ballot marking device.25
This technology is an advanced method used to count votes when compared to other types of
voting technologies. It is important to note that this technology is flexible. With the thousands of
counties in the United States, it is important that any voting technology is adaptable to fit the
needs of each county that uses them. These machines are still used in many jurisdictions today.
Direct Recording Electronic (DRE’s) voting machines are a part of the latest
advancement of voting technology. This type of voting technology was first created to assist in
recording votes on the floor of the legislature.26 Notably, there are two main companies that
22

Ibid.
Ibid.
24
Ibid.
25
Voting Equipment, “Verified Voting”, Verified Voting, 3/12/21, https://verifiedvoting.org/votingequipment/
26
Jones, Douglas W., “A Brief Illustrated History of Voting”, Voting and Elections Web Pages, The University of
Iowa Department of Computer Science, 3/12/21.
23
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manufactured DRE’s: Electrovote and Microvote. The older model, Microvote, had too fewer
buttons required by many jurisdictions to run their elections.27 On the other hand, Electrovote is
considered to incorporate more technology, using a “smartcard interface” as well as a
touchscreen.28 Since the devices have a user-friendly interface, they are manageable to use
regardless of one’s comfort level with technology. Jones explains that the Evervote DRE as,
… a wedge shaped affair, basically an IBM PC compatible with a touch screen, packaged
for voting, with a secure case that prevents keyboard or mouse from being plugged in
while it is in the polling place. The machine plugs into a network hub that also includes a
UPS (uninterruptable power supply, including battery pack), and sits in a voting booth
that is little more than a table with a corrugated plastic privacy screen -- this is a bare
minimum voting booth, but the flat panel display screen on the voting machine has very
poor off axis viewing, so the privacy is a bit better than the minimal booth suggests. 29
Figure 1.2 illustrates the components of a DRE. The privacy shield signifies to the voter that
their vote a private one and that their privacy is still a priority. Additionally, the touchscreen
interface speeds up the voting process on election day. This technology tries to prevent a number
of different issues that could occur during the voting process such as an unstable power supply
which was seen as a problem for other voting technologies. DRE’s are no doubt one of the most
advanced types of voting technology produced in recent years.

27

Ibid.
Ibid.
29
Ibid.
28
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Figure 1.2 Representation of a Direct Recording Electronic (DRE)
machine
Source: Google

A historical account exemplifying the advancement of voting technology is absolutely
necessary to bring attention to. Having this understanding of the historical context aligns with
how election boards choose to implement voting technology and how they decide to update older
technology. On a similar note, the sequential nature of the advancement of voting technology
provides various insights to how one voting machine and its faults contribute to the shift to new
voting technologies. Since the beginning of elections, there has been substantial change in how
they are administered and how votes are tabulated. The timeline brings attention to many
concerns as to how voting machines produced in the 1980s is still being used in many
jurisdictions today and how systems with proven problems are still being used. This leads to the
next discussion of the 2000 election where outdated, flawed technology wreaked havoc on the
state of Florida.
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1.2 The 2000 Election and the Help America Vote Act
The 2000 Presidential Election brought attention to a number of flaws in the United
States’ electoral process. The race between the Republican candidate, George W. Bush and
Democratic candidate Al Gore relied heavily on the results in Florida. This race was considered
the closest presidential election in the history of the United States and was clearly unprecedented
that the judicial system did not know how to provide the right remedy to derive a solution to the
situation. A significant issue that led to the uncertainty of 2000 General Election was the newly
designed ballot used in Palm Beach County, Florida. In Palm Beach County, the puzzling design
of the ballot used in the election and the implementation of outdated voting technology led to the
intent of voters to not be fully represented as they wished.30 Many who intended to vote for Al
Gore, had their vote misrepresented and in turn not counted. The chaos that ensued led to a Bush
presidency. This sections will rely heavily on the work of a team of scholars from various
institutions that played a significant role in analyzing constituents’ intent and what went wrong
in Palm Beach County, Florida.31
Unlike the case in almost every other election carried out in the United States, the 2000
election was a wakeup call to the country about the delicacy of the electoral process. One
alarming summary of the findings from Brady et al. is that the voting system failed the country.
They state, “We saw, up close, a very significant problem—the failure of our voting system to
convert people’s vote intentions into counted votes- chopped into law-suit sized pieces that
obliterated the larger picture and led to legalistic solutions that often seemed to miss the point."32
The key point here is that a legal remedy would not suffice. Citizens and administrators alike

30

Mann, Thomas E., “Reflections on the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election., The Brookings Institute, 1/1/01,
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/reflections-on-the-2000-u-s-presidential-election/.
31
Brady et al., “Law and Data: The Butterfly Ballot Episode”58
32
Brady et al., “Law and Data: The Butterfly Ballot Episode”,59

Blaustein 18
looked to the courts for a solution. Before the legal ramifications and precedents associated with
2000 election law are explored, I the problem of the butterfly ballot and in turn the major
problems that arose on November 7th 2000 must be examined.
In preparation for the 2000 Presidential Election, Palm Beach County, Florida decided to
implement a new ballot format. This ballot, when aligned with the holes for the punch card
system, did not line up correctly to the candidate, leading to mass confusion among voters.33
Figure 1.4 provides an example of the ballot used in Palm Beach County. As seen, the punch
hole that signifies a selection for president is not actually coinciding with the candidate the hole
represents. This exact reasoning resonates with how other voters perceived the ballot and
suggests that there was more than a select few who suffered from this confusion. As a result, in
Palm Beach County, the race between George W. Bush and Al Gore boiled down to 537 ballots
and ultimately cost Gore the election.34 Calculations by Brady et al., show that about 2,000
supporters for Gore accidently casted their vote for Buchanan.35 From the 20% of Floridians who
supported Buchanan, 7% of that support came from Palm Beach County.36 On a similar note, the
number of overvotes calculated during this election was upwards of 19,000.37 For clarity, an
overvote occurs when a voter indicates two choices for a contest that only allows for one choice
to be made.

33

Mestel, Spenser, “How bad ballot design can sway the result of an election”, The Guardian, 11/19/2019,
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/nov/19/bad-ballot-design-2020-democracy-america
34
Ibid.
35
Ibid.
36
Ibid.
37
Ibid.
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Figure 1.3 Example Ballot from the 2000 Presidential election used in Palm Beach
County, Florida
Source: Google

The researchers also concluded that there was sufficient evidence beyond the doubt of
circumstance that there was a problem with this election. The authors state the following:
We find that Buchanan’s Palm Beach County vote total is not merely large but that in
statistical terms it is extraordinary. Furthermore, we examined voting patterns within
Palm beach County and find strong statistical evidence that Buchanan voters are
concentrated in the most liberal precincts of Palm Beach County. We also find that
invalid, double-punched ballots—presumably double-punched ballots for Gore and
Buchanan— tend to come from relatively liberal precincts. These two findings are
evidence for the claim that the ballot format in Palm Beach County led some Gore
supporters to vote for Buchanan, and in some cases, to vote for multiple presidential
candidates.38
These findings were alarming at the time and even more distressing 11 years later. The fact that
the electoral process and voters intent were threatened by a mechanism of elections that is 100%
controllable is cause for great concern. Even more disturbing are the affidavits stating that voters
were denied help after asking poll workers to assist with their selection of a candidate due to the
38

Ibid.
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confusing nature of the ballot.39 The women’s anecdote goes as follows. She asserts that she was
familiar with the ballot structure after looking at the ballot before going to vote. This women was
also a poll worker, leading to the assumption that she knew the ins and outs of the electoral
process that occurs on election day. This voter claims that she requested assistance from the poll
worker to ensure she casted her vote for Al Gore. She was denied assistance and was
embarrassed to ask for further assistance. Instead, the voter punched the hole she believed was
right. Her husband received further clarification was told to punch the second and third holes to
indicate Al Gore and his running mate.40 This one example is a clear indication that the butterfly
ballot made it more difficult for voters to cast their vote as they wished to.
The debate on how to handle the situation in Palm Beach County made its way into the
legal system. Many judges in Florida recused themselves from the case brought to the courts by
Florida Attorney, David Krathen.41 Looking to the courts for clarity on the 2000 election led to a
slippery slope. The courts may not have been the best place to look for an answer. The courts
look at two types of information: Case law that establishes precedent and the State and U.S.
Constitution. The intricacies of elections and election law thwarted the willingness of judges to
take on the case presented to the court. For this specific case, judged recused themselves left and
right because they did not want to be the one to decide a case that was so unprecedented. The
facts of this case were daunting and having to decide whether a revote was necessary in Palm
Beach County was a decision that could tarnish their reputation. After a number of recusals, the
judge assigned to the case was Judge Labarga.42 Judge Labarga explained during the hearing that

39
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he was unsure that he had the constitutional authority to order a revote in Palm Beach County.43
He asked each party to find a case where a revote was ordered during a presidential election and
there was little out there.44 The argument could be made that aspects of the ballot violated
Florida law, but highlighting the design flaws of the ballot would not be sufficient to make a
judge declare it as defective.45
A few days later, the judge issued his opinion which points out that because of the
dubious language, which makes up the Constitution required the electors to be elected on the
same day.46 Since every other state had certified a winner, it would be unsound to allow a revote
to occur in Palm Beach County. The constitution also contains a clause that represents the fact
that a revote could provide a disadvantage to one candidate and an advantage to the other which
would be unconstitutional.47 Brady et al., states an important insight. They state, “The facts of
the butterfly ballot proclaimed a significant injustice, but the law appeared blind to the problem
and unable to deal with it.”48 It was recognized that there were flaws in the ballots design, but the
judge did not find sufficient evidence to challenge the legality of the ballot and as a result, the
court did not find it defective according to the law.49 This set a damaging precedent and
threatened the citizens constitutional right to elect officials. By the court not standing up for the
constitutional right to vote, it put any ability to institute and instill change in how jurisdictions
administer elections in a compromising condition.
The issue of the butterfly ballot brought great attention to the issues of election
administration and more specifically, voting technology. Conversations about the implications of
43

Ibid.
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antiquated voting technology called for the investigation into the improvement of election
administration. One action taken by the federal government was the creation of new legislation.
The most notable form of election administration legislation crafted by the United States
Congress was in 2002. The Help America Vote Act or HAVA aimed to appropriate funds of the
federal government to state governments to revamp their voting technology and to modernize
their technology, phasing out punch card systems and lever voting systems. This legislation was
the Federal response to what occurred during the 2000 election. Besides providing funds to
advance punch card voting machines and lever voting machines, the HAVA also required state
election boards and governments to provide voting access to the disabled, created the Election
Assistance Commission, created an updated voter registration form, and created new guidelines
for testing and certification protocols for voting machine software and hardware.50 It also called
for a clearinghouse that aimed to hold resources, information, and mutual practices for states.51
This step by the federal government was undoubtedly necessary due to the state and local
governments inability to recognize and facilitate these crucial changes on their own.
The HAVA wished to bring about change to a an array of issues within election
administration. This is important to improve the overall administration of elections, but it is
especially important for advancing voting technology. Before the HAVA, there was minimal
legislation enacted by the federal government that focused on voting technology. By starting the
conversation on the congressional floor, the federal government exemplified their commitment to
investigating and improving election technology.

50

U.S. Congress, House Committee, Help America Vote Act of 2002, 2.
Election Assistance Commission, “Help America Vote Act”,
3/12/21,https://www.eac.gov/about_the_eac/help_america_vote_act.aspx
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One important condition of the Help America Vote Act relating to voting technology was
the federal funding provided to states to advance their voting technology from the previously
noted punch card and lever voting systems. The HAVA provided specific guidelines for how the
money should be spent, which included abiding by the protocols set forth in the act, education
for the public on voting standards and voting technology, training those working the polls, and to
implement some form of voting technology that is usable for those who are disabled.52 The act
also “required voting systems to allow the voter to review, verify, and change their vote before
casting it.”53 As noted in The Brennan Center of Justice’s Report on United States voting
machines, local board of elections do not have the funds to invest in and acquire new voting
systems.54 Additionally, if the federal government did not act sooner, then the risks associated
with punch card systems and lever machines would be exacerbated. By the federal government
providing monetary assistance to state and local governments, jurisdictions were able to make
the big purchases they needed and take active strides to ensure democracy.
On a similar note, the HAVA also provided the disabled with the ability to cast their
intent by keeping the secret ballot in play. This legislation ensured that a voting machine with
accessibility features, such as an audio feature and a controller that helps the voter make a
selection in a contest, which makes it possible for anyone who is disabled to vote without any
assistance. I can speak for Suffolk County in New York State ensured that these machines were
programmed and working. The machines used by Suffolk County are pictured below (Figure
1.5). These machines were produced by Dominion Voting Systems Inc., a well-known producer
of election equipment. The voting machine pictured below works in the following way. The
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controller, which is similar to a Gameboy controller, allows the voter to maneuver through the
candidates for each contest and select their choice. Figure 1.6 shows how a voter would use the
controller to “vocalize” their intent of support. Along with this controller, there are headphones
that connected to the machine allowing the voter to hear directions that assist in navigating the
voting process. For those who are paralyzed or are unable to use the controller, there is a tube
that attaches to the machine allowing the voter to use the force of their breath to pick their
candidate for a given contest. The HAVA paved the way for those who are disabled to cast their
vote with the same liberties as those free of any ailments.

Figure 1.4 Representation of a Tabulator that can be used by the disabled.
Source: Google
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Figure 1.5 Diagram of controller with explanations on usage.
Source: Google

The establishment of the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) was essential to
establishing a stronger relationship between the federal government and state and local
jurisdictions. The EAC was created to act as a gateway to advisory panels and guidelines that
were standard to Federal elections.55 The EAC worked to create voluntary voting equipment
guidelines and to ensure that the “clearinghouse of information” was accessible to state and local
governments, so they could find all guidelines and recommendations.56 This action taken by
Congress is a step in the right direction to unify the approach to Federal elections taken on by
state and local governments. One major drawback is that the protocols produced by the EAC
were and still are voluntary, meaning that states and local jurisdictions could use discretion when
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choosing what to implement and if they implement these suggestions at all. The theoretical
framework of electoral federalism, which is discussed in the next section, helps explain the intent
of this arrangement.
In order to safeguard the transition to new technologies, there needed to be guidelines
that explicitly pointed jurisdictions in the right direction when making these decisions. The
committee commenced by HAVA, the Technical Guidelines Development Committee, intended
to create guidelines for voting technology and its machinery.57 Even if these guidelines are not
adapted by all 50 states, the establishment of these guidelines is an important statement and
commitment to advancing election technology. The HAVA exemplifies the commitment of the
federal government to ensure the quality of U.S. elections.
1.3 Election Federalism
The standards associated with the certification and verification of election technology is
dependent on the statues, laws and regulations imposed by local governments, state
governments, and the federal government. This convoluted, jurisdictional relationship between
all levels of government is the result of election federalism. According to Weinstein-Tull,
election federalism has two recognizable attributes. These attributes are categorized as, “(1)
unusually expansive federal power to legislate pursuant to the Election Clause; and (2)
widespread state prerogative to delegate election responsibilities to local government.”58
Weinstein-Tull argues that election law federalism encompasses two apparent features- the wide
power of the federal infrastructure to regulate and the state’s privilege to delegate responsibility
to local jurisdictions.59 This definition leads to a number of different analyses when it comes to
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deciphering what parts of the electoral process are under each level of government’s jurisdiction.
The Election Clause in the United States Constitution states “The Times, Places, and Manner of
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the
Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations,
except as to the Places of chusing Senators.”60 The creators of the Constitution aimed to give
state governments a majority of the control when deciding how to administer elections. They
also realized that the federal government (the legislative body) should be able to “check” other
governing bodies and maintain the capacity to pass laws to assist in the process. The Founders
intended for the Election Clause to give power to the states to plan elections according to their
own specific procedures and nothing more.61
This interpretation of the Election Clause of the U.S. Constitution gives state
governments immeasurable power when it comes to the administration of elections. As a result,
the federal government has little control over how states choose to conduct elections. The
Framers envisioned the Election Clause to operate in this manner because with so many
jurisdictions, it would be impossible for the federal government to administer elections across the
country and do it well. Currently, there are 3,006 counties located in the United States.62 If the
federal government took on the burden of preparing elections across each state and within each
county, there would be a number of significant challenges to overcome. Additionally, WeinsteinTull calls elections “hyperfederalized”; that is, many key election decisions are made at the local
level.”63 It is also important to note that election administration is not a high-ranked or important
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issue of the federal government. This is one reason why the federal government delegates
election administration to state governments. This transfer of responsibility helps ensure that
elections are ran in accordance to federal and state law, since each state has their own laws and
policies for administering elections. State governments further delegate these responsibilities to
local governments. Local governments are tasked with carrying out the election administration
from voter registration to the tabulation and certification of votes. Theoretically, the hierarchy of
election administration used today should operate in a way that produces few issues. Each county
will carry out elections as they see fit, keeping in mind the needs of their constituents and current
election law. One concern that arises when looking at elections is that there are 3,006 different
methods used. With each county having their own distinct ways of operating, there are many
discrepancies that occur between counties and states. This may be appropriate for electing for
local and state elections, but, for electing officials to the House, Senate, and Presidency, it may
not be the best method. Interpretations of the Election Clause leads to the conclusions that it is up
to state and therein local governments to administer state and local elections as they wish. But,
the federal government has clear jurisdiction over the administration of federal elections and the
federal government can require states to adapt its wishes. An example of this occurred in 2002
with the federal government requiring states to phase out punch card and lever voting systems.
Indeed, they provided the funds for this advancement, but by doing so, the federal government
was able to appeal to states to make the change. A similar application of this action was seen in
1984 when the federal government tied increasing the legal drinking age from 18 to 21 to federal
funding for state highways.64 Although it is not in the same realm of government administration,
the application of this principle is sound. The notion that the federal government could use
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money and other incentives as bait for states to follow their preferred course of action represents
a clear economic power that the federal government holds compared to the “power” of state
governments. The amount of money the federal government was able to provide to states for
voting equipment was substantial and enough to cause jurisdictions to comply.
Election federalism takes into consideration the rights of each aspect of government and
as a result, appears to be the most beneficial approach to election administration. Indeed, there
are a number of different issues that arise within this infrastructure. Given that states could be at
odds with the wishes of the federal government, they could choose to not hold up their end and
not implement federal policies. This occurred in 2005 with the state of Alabama, not due to
opposition of the legislation, but due to the fact the Attorney General felt the state did not have
the authority to do so. Weinstein-Tull states,
In 2005, the Alabama attorney general issued an opinion stating that the Alabama
secretary of state did not have the authority to select a particular voting system or
designate a set of acceptable systems for Alabama counties in order to comply with
HAVA. Nor did the secretary of state, according to the opinion, have the authority to
prevent the counties from purchasing certain systems. When Alabama proposed a new
law that would permit the secretary of state to select the available voting machines for the
counties, county officials objected to surrendering the authority that they had long
possessed. Alabama did ultimately enact that legislation, and brought the state into
compliance with HAVA. The Alabama attorney general opinion demonstrates Alabama’s
genuine belief that it lacked the ability to comply with HAVA until it enacted
implementing legislation—that is, a belief that HAVA itself did not give Alabama
sufficient authority to comply with its terms.65
The Alabama attorney general’s opinion brings attention to a fallacy of election federalism. Just
because the federal government passes legislation that gives states the power to implement the
federal government’s wishes, there are other factors that thwart such advancement. Since
counties are tasked with implementing voting technology, there was resistance by the state to
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start the process of phasing out lever and punch card voting machines. The fact that the attorney
general felt that the secretary of state did not have the right to implement the act on a state level
shows how laws and state constitutions can have an adverse effect on elections when states are in
competition with each other. Election federalism makes it extremely difficult to make
advancements in election administration because of the many players involved. In addition to the
obstacle of implementing new policies, there is a lack of accountability between the levels of
government. States use the organization of election administration to scapegoat and escape
accountability by blaming county governments or by claiming that the laws of the state forbid
them to act.66
In a similar realm, state governments can make it extremely difficult for local
jurisdictions to administer their part of the electoral process, whether it is done on purpose or as
an unforeseen consequence. This was the case with the State of New York and Nassau and
Putnam County. The Albany County Board of Elections wrote a memo which spoke to the
challenges the law placed on counties. Weinstein-Tull remarks, “The State has made compliance
impossible by failing to certify a list of approved voting systems in sufficient time for local
boards to undertake all the necessary preparations for an orderly transition to the new
machines.”67 It was suggested that the time requirement set by the Help America Vote Act, to
have the new technology implemented by the 2007 Primary Election, made it impossible for
counties to implement the changes before New York State tested the security of these
machines.68 Putnam County stood to lose a momentous amount of funding because the county
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was unable to implement these changes due to the states failure to act.69 In a similar light, Nassau
County echoed the same argument, arguing that it was New York State’s responsibility to
comply with the act and they failed to do so.70 The jurisdictional relationship between state and
local governments leads to a lack of accountability that is detrimental to election administration
and to democracy. The State further delegates election responsibilities to county governments,
but does not yield the duty to be held accountable as they are the jurisdiction that further
prescribes the authority of election administration to counties. In this case, the state of New York
was at fault for not providing the necessary certifications and support for local jurisdictions. This
echoes the numerous types of issues that arise when each level of government fails to work
together and instead figures that another level of government would pick up the slack and make
up for it.
Election federalism plays a critical role in the administration of elections. As seen with
the implementation of the Help America Vote Act, the challenges of delegating of election
responsibilities cause harm when the efforts are coordinated, but rather in competition with each
other. This section provides a historical explanation to uncover the innerworkings of election
administration based on the intent of the framework of the United States Constitution. Analyzing
the role of election federalism in the overall infrastructure of elections, I argue, creates the
necessary framework to analyze voting technology and the issues it continues to cause with the
overall voting process. There needs to be better cooperation between all levels of government
when implementing new policies and regulations. Federalism was not instituted to segregate the
hierarchy of government. The Founders understood that state governments needed a prominent
voice in the governing process, but they did not intend for different levels of government to stand
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back from their duties, burdening lower levels of government. Governing the electoral process is
too large and too important to be a one level responsibility and the burden of election
administration will lie one level of government if this delegation continues.
The history of voting technology is essential to our understanding of election
administration. A historical perspective provides a gateway to a plethora of analyses to be made
as well as to the political circumstances that sparked these important conversations and
improvements. As the sequence of events personifies, voting technology ranges in specificity and
purpose. It also speaks to the amazing advancements that have been made to ensure that the
voters’ intent is heard and that elections are ran smoothly and accurately. It is notable to
recognize the path the process of election administration took to advance voting technology to
where it is today. Since the times of the paper ballot, elections have been able to make
remarkable progress, creating machines that accommodate those with disabilities as well making
the process of casting a vote fairly easy. As election technology got more advanced, problems
arose with its implementation which has lasting effects still to this today.
The crisis that was a result of the 2000 Presidential Election was a wake-up call to all
about the fragility of the electoral process. The fact that an entire election was undermined by the
structure of a ballot in one county is astonishing. This issue made it clear that something in the
election process needed to be changed. The Help America Vote Act was a monumental act that
led to many conversations about the necessary changes that needed to occur in order to update
outdated voting technologies such as the lever voting machines and the punch card voting
machines. In turn, election federalism helps explain the complexities of election administration,
highlighting the many jurisdictions that are a part of the process. It leads to a lack of
accountability from different levels of government adding to issues with election administration.
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Although it is grounded in the United States Constitution, the application of federalism in
election administration may do more harm than good and needs to be re-evaluated.
1.4 Election Technology As A Political Phenomenon
The ability of citizens and elected members of American society to debate, share
concerns, and work together to achieve prosperity is fundamentally the practice of politics. It is
defined by its reliance on a power differential between citizens and elected officials at every
level of government- from local towns and villages to the most powerful positions in the United
States’ government. Many theories of democracy explore the relations between citizens and
forms of government, which seek to justify and explain why choosing elected officials to
represent citizens’ desires and needs works. Democratic practices in the United States
government leads, in theory, to being represented and heard. The means to this end are reliant on
one democratic process that is often taken for granted: elections. The electoral process requires a
medium that takes voter intent and transcribes it into a counted vote. This tangible medium,
rather than the inherent systems that create electoral systems of administration, is election
technology. This section seeks to argue and explain how election technology is a political entity
and how its problems are untimely cured by practicing politics.
As previously mentioned that the research and development of voting technologies is
carried out by private companies, free from the influence of political groups and organizations.
Because the advancement of such technology is funded by private entities, it is not tied to the
political apparatus of the United States. Although it appears on the surface that private
companies such as Dominion Voting Systems Inc.71 or Election Systems & Software, LLC
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(ES&S)72 are responsible for such advancement, they are subjected to adhere to regulations and
requirements created by the U.S. government. Additionally, voting machines created by private
companies are used in government sanctioned processes. Based on this logic, voting technology
is an issue of the body politic. The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) and its updated
requirements for voting machines demonstrates this point. The HAVA, passed in 2002, required
the phasing out of lever voting machines and punch card voting machines that led to the
disastrous problem in Palm Beach County, Florida. This had a direct effect on these private
companies because it changed the market for voting technologies. As time passed and the older
technologies were phased out, the shift in market demand to a need for more advanced voting
technologies. If it were not for this piece of election legislation, private companies would not be
as motivated to invest in research and development to create new voting technologies.
The government, on a system level, interacts politically with election technology
manufactures, making the relationship political. It is also elected officials and political groups
that make voting technology a political issue. The recent actions taken by President Trump, the
Trump Campaign and its allies in the 2020 Presidential Election to spread a misinformation
campaign to discredit Dominion Voting Systems Inc. because President Trump lost the election
is a political issue. To preface the subsequent argument, former President Donald Trump lost the
popular vote 46.91% to President Joe Biden who obtained 51.38% of the popular vote.73 In terms
of the Electoral College vote, former President Trump lost to President Biden who obtained 306
electoral votes to Trump’s 236 votes.74 Additionally, the Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security
Agency (CISA) released a statement declaring the following:

72

U.S. Election Assistance Commission, “Election Systems & Software Inc,” (ES&S).” 3/12/21,
https://www.eac.gov/voting-equipment/registered-manufacturers/election-systems-software-inc-ess
73
2020 Presidential Election Results,https://elections.ap.org/dailykos/results/2020-11-03/state/US
74
National Archives, “2020 Electoral College Results”, 3/12/21, https://www.archives.gov/electoral-college/2020

Blaustein 35
The November 3rd election was the most secure in American history. Right now, across
the country, election officials are reviewing and double checking the entire election
process prior to finalizing the result. When states have close elections, many will recount
ballots. All of the states with close results in the 2020 presidential race have paper
records of each vote, allowing the ability to go back and count each ballot if necessary.
This is an added benefit for security and resilience. This process allows for the
identification and correction of any mistakes or errors. There is no evidence that any
voting system deleted or lost votes, changed votes, or was in any way compromised.
Other security measures like pre-election testing, state certification of voting equipment,
and the U.S. Election Assistance Commission’s (EAC) certification of voting equipment
help to build additional confidence in the voting systems used in 2020.
While we know there are many unfounded claims and opportunities for misinformation
about the process of our elections, we can assure you we have the utmost confidence in
the security and integrity of our elections, and you should too. When you have questions,
turn to elections officials as trusted voices as they administer elections.75
In the days leading up to November 3, President Trump, with the help of his allies such as his
private legal counsel Rudy Giuliani, Sidney Powell and news organizations like Fox News,
claimed that if he was going to lose the election, it would be due to widespread election fraud.76
They blatantly ignored the facts presented by numerous agencies of both state and federal
governments. They prepared their response in case they lost the election. In the days after the
Associated Press declared a winner of the 2020 Presidential Election, former President Trump
and his co-actors went rampant with accusations that Dominion Voting Systems Inc. flipped
votes to Joe Biden.77 The former president himself, as well as the others mentioned above,
barked inaccurate claims in press conferences, appearances on news segments, and postings on
social media (Twitter) that directly undermined the results of the election and the reputation of
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Dominion Voting Systems Inc., since a portion of the public (Trump supporters) believed these
false claims.
As a result, Dominion Voting Systems Inc. filed a lawsuit against Rudolph Giuliani,
Sidney Powell, Mike Lindell, and Fox News based on the grounds of defamation. The New York
times says the following about the case against Giuliani-The suit seeks damages of more than $1.3 billion and is based on more than 50
statements Mr. Giuliani made at legislative hearings, on Twitter, on his podcast and in the
conservative news media, where he spun a fictitious narrative of a plot by one of the
biggest voting machine manufacturers in the country to flip votes to President Biden.”78
One false claim plastered across the internet and voiced by the defendants is that Dominion has
ties to a Venezuelan Dictator and was started in the country to fix the results of the Venezuelan
election of Hugo Chávez.79 Another lie that was shared by the defendants was that an employee
of Dominion Voting Systems Inc. was a part of the terrorist group, ANTIFA.80 The brunt of the
blame was placed on Eric Coomer, the Director of Product Strategy and Security for Dominion
Voting Systems Inc.81 Oltmann, a defendant of the case brought on by Dr. Coomer, took the
issue to a Conservative Daily Podcast, stating,
Let’s not sugar coat this, we’re going to expose someone inside of Dominion Voting
Systems specifically related to Antifa and related to someone that is so far left and is
controlling the elections, and his fingerprints are in every state. So I want you guys to
understand that what we’re about to show you, you have to share . . . The conversation
will be about a man named Eric Coomer. C-O-O-M-E-R.82
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This is only one example of the many accounts of the misinformation campaign that occurred
before, during , and after the 2020 Election. The actions taken by these parties undermined the
results of the election, causing many citizens to doubt the electoral process.
By targeting voting technology and its reliability as the main culprit of fraud, the Trump
Campaign and its allies threatened democracy. As a result of the former presidents’ incapability
to accept his fate, the entire electoral process was questioned. If that is not a political issue, what
is. Calling the United States electoral process fraudulent undermined the authority of the
government to carry out fair elections as well and brought doubt about the results of the election.
Voting technology is tied to the process by which citizens choose elected officials to represent
their political needs and desires. Voting technology is no doubt an infrastructure that needs to be
addressed by politics.
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Chapter 2: Ethnographic Account of My Experience at the Suffolk County BOE
My time at the Suffolk County Board of Elections (SCOBE) contributed to the creation
of this topic and to my basic understanding of voting technology. In this regard, the experiences I
bring attention to are strictly observational. I bring a unique perspective to the issues facing
election technology and its administration. I was not a long-term employee of the Suffolk County
Board of Elections, allowing me to see a different perspective than other employees. Many
employees worked at the BOE for decades and it was noticeable that they got bogged-down in
the office culture and BOE operations. In short, many employees overlooked ways to reach
optimum productivity and often times settled with methods they employed to complete their
tasks. As a short-term employee of the Suffolk County Board of Elections, I was able to take a
step back from the office politics and truly see the BOE operate in its truest form. This chapter
will explore my experiences during my first “stint” at the Suffolk County Board of Elections. In
the subsequent pages, I will delve into the office culture, my relationships with other employees,
and my overall observations of how tasks are carried out.
I had gotten the opportunity to intern at the Suffolk County Board of Elections through
my father. The Republican Commissioner, is a law student at the same Law School my father
attended. The Commissioner reached out to my father to help him with some classwork and they
became contacts and colleagues. My dad mentioned to him that I was a Political Science major at
Union College and had an interest in law. That summer I had shoulder surgery and was unable to
adhere to the requirements of a full time internship. I was in a immobilization sling for two
months and with the demand of physical therapy and not being able to drive, it was safer for me
to remain at home. This internship at the Suffolk County Board of Elections was the perfect
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opportunity for me to gain more experience in the legal field as well as in the field of public
service and local government, while still making my recovery a priority.
2.1 SCOBE Office Culture
The Suffolk County Board of Elections is located in Yaphank, New York. It is an older
building off of a major roadway surrounded by the Health Department, the Sherriff’s office, and
other county government buildings. The SCOBE is a bi-partisan office, meaning that there were
both Republican and Democrat “sides” to everything the BOE did. I worked for the Republicans,
and was responsible only to the Republican administrators. Every action taken was carried out in
a bi-partisan manner. A Democrat and Republican would work in tandem with each other,
whether they were sitting at the front desk as the receptionist or if they were processing absentee
ballots. Every major decision was made by both Democrat and Republican leaders. The
hierarchy of the BOE was simple, but had drastic effects on office culture. Both sides (Democrat
and Republican) had a Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, Senior Assistant Commissioner,
and an Assistant Commissioner. In the front office there were also assistants and office
managers. Although not all those roles were filled, there were a handful of individuals who you
knew were in charge. The rest of the employees at the BOE worked in different areas or
departments. They ranged from the warehouse where they worked on voting machines, those
who managed voter registration records, those who processed and manually implemented
records, and those who were responsible absentee ballots. Within each department there was a
Democrat and Republican who acted as the team leader, managing other employees within the
department. Both those in charge and those at the bottom of the hierarchy often had to
compromise and debate over certain issues and plans of action.
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The bipartisan nature of the BOE created a tense environment at times. Very early on I
learned who belonged to each party and the implications this label had on the work relationships
in the BOE. I found that the Democrats were in the company of other Democrats while
Republicans did the same. There was awkward tension between some individuals of different
parties which was apparent an hour into my internship. When something went wrong, some were
quick to place blame on those of the opposite party. This occurred a number of different times. I
would contribute this to the employees’ increased sense of partisanship which made them lose
focus on the big picture which was that they were working for the greater good and for a greater
cause.
It was also apparent that I was one of the most educated in the back office. Very few
employees had a college degree. Most has some level of education but many others just had a
high school education. As someone who was more tech savvy and in college, I approached
problems differently and was able to change the way in which tasks were approached. For
example, I was creating poll worker books for each early voting polling place. It was to be done
by hand. I was tasked with drawing lines on a paper, making sure that it was neat and legible. I
was given a guide to follow, but that was little help. The BOE was getting close to the start of
Early Voting, working twelve hour days to ensure that everything was ready. It took me about
six hours to get the lines and spacing perfect. When I went to show my supervisor, they changed
the format but didn’t tell me. So back to the drawing board I went. By 7pm, I was done
reworking the book. I turned to the supervisors and said “You know, I could of done this on
Excel and had it done in fifteen minutes.” They were so surprised and said that whenever I had a
new idea or a quicker way to get things done, to tell them. This is when I realized that the reason
why the BOE carried out tasks the way they did was not because they were opposed to
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innovation, it was because if the process wasn’t flawed, there was no reason to fix it. This theme
became apparent in many of the initiatives taken on by the BOE.
2.2 My Experiences and Observations
I worked in the Inspector’s Office which was tasked with training and coordinating poll
workers for each town and each polling place. This department was also responsible for ensuring
that poll workers were paid for their training for the time they put in during early voting and
election day. There were different levels of poll workers and their level was decided by a
percentage identifying how well they performed in past elections. The best were designated as
chairs and the ranged from coordinators to assistants. This hierarchy echoes the hierarchy that is
experienced working at the Suffolk County Board of Elections.
My first stint at the SCOBE was two weeks long in August of 2019. I worked regular
hours, 9am to 5pm. My other stint was for the month of June in 2020, during the Coronavirus
pandemic. I will touch on this time period more specifically in the next section. During June
2020, I worked weekdays for 10-12 hours a day, weekends for a few hours, and on election day I
worked from 4:40 AM to around 10:30 PM, leaving only because one of the police officers had
COVID and I didn’t want to be exposed to the people the officer had been around. I often came
in early and was last to leave my department. I was given the option to not work on the weekend,
but happily did. Working the 2020 Primary was a one in a lifetime opportunity and I was happy
to give up my weekends to watch it all unfold. The more seasoned workers at the SCOBE were
able to leave at 4pm and those who were just starting work had to arrive at 8:30am and were able
to leave at 4:30pm. Although I was considered a “new worker” it was clear from the start that I
would be allowed to come and go as I pleased and was given more leeway in terms of what I did
around the office. For starters, I often times would be pulled away from my desk to complete
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special tasks such as research for the Republican Assistant Commissioner or to listen in on the
Commissioner and his team read through contracts. The Republican Deputy Commissioner went
above and beyond to show me things she believed I would be interested in and showed me the
cases she was working on. It didn’t matter what I was doing, if they called me up to the front, I
went. Alongside the access and exposure I was provided with, I received another luxury, the use
of the internet. Back office employees did not get access to an internet browser. At the start of
my internship, I did not have access to the internet. I needed it to work on a project for the
commissioner and in five minutes, I had it.
When others in my department found out that I had received internet access, many did
not care. One employee did have lot to say about it. This employee’s work ethic mimicked the
work ethic of the many who worked there. There was a saying that meandered its way across the
departments of the Suffolk County Bord of Elections. It was “work on county time.” I was told
this early on, that those I worked with advocated and pushed me to work slower than I intended
to. It seemed to become the anthem of the seasoned workers of the BOE. This women did the
bare minimum. With every assignment given, she would procrastinate. She would spend most of
the day on her phone and complain about the work she did not complete. When the deadlines got
close, she would still manage to complain while rushing to complete her work. One day, I was
working on a project that required me to research and provide synopses of new election
legislation that was recently passed for the Assistant Commissioner. My co-worker peered in my
direction and saw what I was doing. She angerly asked what I was doing and how I managed to
get internet service, given that I was an intern and in her eyes lowest on the totem pole. Before I
could answer, she went on a 30 minute angered rant about how she has worked for the BOE for
over 20 years and believes that she is entitled to have internet access. She further explained that
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she should have internet access so she can pay her bills. The BOE is known to have terrible
phone service as well, leading to her added difficulty of paying her bills from her desk. I started
to realize that not giving internet access to all employees was the right call. Many employees
would take advantage of it and use it to further procrastinate their work.
Beyond this one employee, there were a small amount of people in the Inspectors
Department who partook in the same antics as this employee. It had a negative effect on the
output of the department’s work. The supervisors had to constantly remind other employees to
do their work. In my department specifically, there were three employees that were famous for
leaving their desk for hours. They would walk in and when questioned where they were, they
were ambiguous with their answers. Their work was for the same town and it rarely got done on
time without help from the supervisors or from myself. I viewed this behavior as laziness, but
then came to realize that the structure and organization of the Board of Elections partially
contributed to these behaviors.
At times, the work at the BOE was scarce for some departments, while other departments
were bombarded with work. When there was not a lot of work to be assigned, people sat on their
phones. Very few were proactive about finding work. Additionally, when there were tasks that
involved more than one department, many hid in their perspective areas, hoping to escape work.
I rarely saw an employee offer assistance to one another and the burden was on the supervisors
of each department to ensure that their department was meeting the expectations of the
commissioners. It was apparent that the stress often times lead to tension which resulted in
certain employees putting in less effort than before. Many in my department would leave when
they were needed the most. The work pace was already slow at the BOE, but when they left the
work was always completed by those who stayed.
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2.3 2019 Early Voting Experience
When we were preparing for Early Voting in 2019, it was the first time Early Voting was
implemented in New York State. The Early Voting legislation was passed by the NYS Senate in
January of 2019.83 The hopes of this bill was to lessen the wait times for voters during election
day and to provide more opportunities for citizens to cast their vote.84 It was clear that everything
we did was trial and error. There was no specific way to implement Early Voting practices in
Suffolk County and the commissioners were tasked with figuring it out. The inspectors office
was tasked with finding poll workers to work the Early Voting locations. At first, the hardest task
was to convince people to sign up for ten days of Early Voting. And for me, the hardest task was
to learn the ins and outs of this new legislation quickly and to be able to explain it to the poll
workers. What amazed me was the knowledge set held by employees, not from formal education,
but from the experiences they’ve had.
For days we worked on securing poll workers to work the 10 days of Early Voting. Over
this time period, I learned a lot about the relationships those in my department had with the poll
workers employed by the BOE. Many of these poll workers were long-term workers. The
majority of poll workers I dealt with were older. They had an understanding of what their duties
were, but many faced difficulty with voting machines and other technologies implemented at the
voting site. Fortunately, NYS law requires BOE employees to be at every early voting location.85
Having BOE employees at the polling site insures that things run smoothly and that if there are
any problems, there are people who can fix them or call the right person to fix them.
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Our main task during Early Voting was to coordinate between poll workers that called us
with problems that had to be fixed by the other employees on the road and as well as those at the
polling place. What made the process go smoothly was the knowledge set held by my co-workers
and the relationships they had with those who worked the polls. As the election cycles went by,
poll workers became friendly with the staff, often times having long, casual conversations with
them. When they called and I answered, I got asked several questions as to who I was and what I
was doing there. This wasn’t meant to be malicious, but it was sometimes clear they would rather
speak to their direct representative than me. It took about a week for the poll workers to be
comfortable talking to me. Once they were comfortable, I would hear countless anecdotes about
what being a part of the electoral process meant to them. I remember one phone call vividly. I
received a call from an assistant coordinator who was very interested in working Early Voting.
After I explained to him the ins and outs of what would be required, he talked to me for twenty
minutes about how much he loves participating in the democratic process and how much he
loves democracy. Although this conversation for me was mundane, I appreciated his sentiment. I
appreciated his words not because I had to but because it was a feeling I rarely saw from those
who worked for the BOE. The employees were bogged down by their partisanship which in turn,
clouded their perceptions on what the electoral process is clearly about.
My first stint at the Suffolk County Board Of Elections opened my eyes to the electoral
process. Just in two weeks I was able to see a side of elections that few people see. The nature of
election administration is schizophrenic. To outsiders, the process, rules, regulations, and flaws
are simplified or inherently unknown. Before this experience, I had little knowledge of what an
election entailed: the bipartisanship nature, the vast number of laws that guide the electoral
process, and the actual process of counting ballots. I thought the process ended at the polls—the
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votes were casted and then there was a winner. There is so much more to elections than citizens
see through the media as well as with our own voting experiences.
2.4 Second Work Period at the Suffolk County BOE
Like the first section of this chapter, this section focuses on the second part of my
experiences at the Suffolk County Board of Elections. The time that I spent there, this time
around, was vastly different than my first experience at the SCBOE. The most salient reason can
be attributed to the fact that the world was in the midst of the coronavirus pandemic. In this
chapter, I will share my experiences in helping prepare for the 2020 Democratic Primary in
Suffolk County. I will share how the office culture has changed due to the impact of COVID-19
as well as my experiences working with voting technology.
2.5 COVID-19 and its Effects on the SCOBE
It was the beginning of June and the BOE had been closed since the start of the
Coronavirus pandemic. The 2020 Primary was moved from April 28, 2020 to June 23, 202086
due to the increased risk of spreading COVID-19 at the polls. Late May, approximately two days
before the start of June, my dad received a phone call from the Republican Commissioner asking
if I would like to work for the month of June at the BOE. They were way behind in their
preparations and needed all the help they could get. It was the second to last week of the spring
trimester, but I was willing to commit to late nights of studying for this once in a lifetime
opportunity. That Monday, I reported to Yaphank, NY and was ready to help prepare for the
primary election.
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When I walked in, the room was filled with scared, stressed out employees. The first
thing came to my mind was how would we be able to accomplish all that the SCOBE had to do
given the primary election was on the horizon. Many shared the fear that going to work would
mean exposure to the coronavirus and it was a concern of mine as well. The precautions that
were in place were rarely followed. People worked on top of each other and maintaining a sixfoot separation was difficult, since the office space was not laid out for this type of work. When
working with the ballots, we had to work in pairs and that meant being less than six feet away
from your partner. If an employee was uncomfortable with this layout, they did not have to
participate. During my time, there was only one employee who was neurotic about social
distancing and mask wearing. I was careful. I always wore my mask and took it off to eat or
drink. I sanitized my hands multiple times an hour and wore gloves when touching absentee
ballots. My supervisor poked fun at my habits, and I would joke back and tell him that he wished
he had my supply of Purell. Many employees took their masks off at their desks which added to
the concern that the coronavirus would spread. It was apparent that many did not take the rules
and regulations seriously while others were more careful about the public health crisis. This was
apparent and it undoubtedly played a role in the chaotic feel of the BOE.
2.6 Election Preparations and Office Culture
When Governor Cuomo extended absentee voting for all New Yorkers for the 2020
Primary, it created a vast surge of absentee ballots that needed to be processed. The governor
signed this executive order to prevent long lines from occurring at polling places, as it increased
the risk of exposure to the coronavirus.87 This was the right call, but it presented the BOE with
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unique challenges. One challenge was waiting on the postal service to process the mail as well as
ensuring that the mail was sorted through in accordance to NYS election law. There were
designated people, mostly temporary employees who were employed to help out with the preelection to-do list, which included examining these ballots. They were tasked with opening the
envelope and separating the mail envelope and the oath envelope that contained the ballot(s).
This was a tedious and long task that lasted for days. It needed to be done in a bi-partisan
manner, which meant more workers around each other. I should preface this by saying that the
tension spread to the front office and it was especially noticeable on the Democratic “side.” One
vivid memory was when the Democratic office manager/assistant commissioner walked into my
department. I was working next to the Republican supervisor on my own laptop waiting to be
told what to do. The room where the ballots were was packed with people. Rather than the
supervisor throwing me in with the ballots and the people, he was preparing something for me to
do. The office manager proceeds to question me. She demanded to know what I was doing. Not
knowing that I did not have to report to her, I told her I was working on some work for class
while I waited for something to do. This wasn’t uncommon for me to do when I had downtime.
Previously, I would study for the LSAT while waiting for more work, which was better than
what other employees were doing. She started to yell at me and then storm off. I was shocked by
the way she handled the situation. She ended up going straight to the Republican Commissioner
and told him I wasn’t working. As a precaution, he emailed the supervisor and told him to keep
me busy so I wasn’t in that situation again. There were many times that the Republican staff
would walk by and see me studying, but knew that once a phone rang or if there was something
to do, I would stop everything to handle it. This situation and others made me recognize the role
partisanship played in the workplace. I should mention that at the end of my time at the BOE she
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praised me, called me a good worker, and didn’t want me to leave. She realized she was quick to
judge me, which I think shows another common theme of the BOE.
For many, partisanship was the first attribute of a person they looked at. I was praised by
other employees for working for the Republican Party. They would constantly say “Welcome to
the right side” or ‘You made a right choice” without knowing my political beliefs. They just
assumed my position based on my affiliation at the BOE. Partisanship was also heightened by
the need for everything to be done in a bi-partisan manner. New York State election law states
that ballots need to be handled by a Democrat and a Republican. This made the label of
Democrat and Republican a salient identifier to the employees of the BOE. The absentee ballots
took days to go through. While the temporary employees were sorting through the ballots, I was
tasked with mailing out letters to all the poll-workers explaining their assignments for the
primary election and a paper containing the link for a video containing COVID guidelines for the
poll-workers to watch. This task was easy, but there were numerous obstacles. As I mentioned
previously, there were a few employees who were notorious for not doing their work in a timely
manner. I had to wait for the last town to be done until I was able to send them out. These letters
had to go out far before we got to them, and it was because these employees chose to take smoke
breaks and complete other activities outside of the BOE. I ended up finishing the work because
of how time sensitive the task was. The person whose work I finished offered to buy be lunch. I
was appalled by this offer since I knew that he knew he was wrong. This is in part how the BOE
worked. Those who went above in terms of their work often made up for the “slackers” of the
BOE workforce.
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2.7 My Experience With Election Technology
One important task I helped oversee was the scanning of absentee ballots. There were
about 80,000 ballots that were sent to the BOE by voters. The front office needed to come up
with a way to manage the ballots as well as make sure they qualified. Qualifications included a
time stamp and proper enclosure of the ballot in the oath envelope. A main motivator for creating
a paper trail of absentee ballots is because voters would call to make sure their absentee ballot
arrived on time. Frankly, there was no way to tell if their ballot came in on time because it was
like finding a needle in a haystack. Scanning the ballots as they came in provided a way to have
accessible evidence for when the lawyers of the candidates came to the BOE to examine the
ballots. Although this was not conventional election technology, we turned it into one. There was
a Republican and Democrat who scanned the ballots and others who helped smooth them out for
us. It was to be one in a bi-partisan manner. If one of us stepped away, we could not touch the
ballots. There were numerous problems with this process. One problem was that the ballots had
to be folded in a specific way to go through the scanner. Many voters folded them terribly
causing the scanner to jam. The ballots also got stuck in the machine which caused many to get
damaged. Hopefully, it did not prevent them from being scanned and eventually tabulated in the
future. Luckily, my counterpart and I managed to scan the 80,000 ballots in about seven or eight
days. We worked long hours to ensure that we would get it done, since we were the only ones
who knew how to carry out the task.
Another major task was the testing and programming of voting machines for the primary.
I programmed about 15 BMD’s (Ballot Marking Devices). One type of BMD’s are voting
machines that allow disabled voters mark a paper ballot before entering it into the tabulator. The
BMD’s were around 10-15 years old and constantly crashed while programming them. They had
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multiple attachments for different people with different types of disabilities. For people who
required least assistance, there was an attachment that looked like an old game boy controller.
This technology allows the voter to navigate the printing process. For those with auditory
disabilities, there were headphones and a voice guides them through the process. Finally, for
those who are unable to use any of these assisting devices, there was a tube that could be
connected to the machine where the voter could blow into the tube and select their candidate.
This was used during the primary. On election day, they were not the most reliable technology in
the voting place. The machines were crashing and to printer attached to the BMD often failed. It
was a tedious and cumbersome process that took days to complete. The machine comprised of a
printer, LCD screen, a scanner, and an attached screen that projected the steps and the contests
for the voter’s electoral district. One constant problem was the AVS stopped working. This led to
delays in the overall process of preparing these machines for election day.
The tabulators worked identically to the BMD’s used by the disabled. To program them,
the machine needed to be turned on, then the two SD cards that hold the data had to be loaded.
The programmer then waited for the AVS to fully load, and makes sure the date and time are
correct. Most likely, the machine would have to be zeroed out from the previous time it was
used. Then after that part of the process was completed, the test decks are put them through the
machine as the test run. After that’s complete, a receipt would be printed noting the process. The
same thing would be done for the “run for the record”. The first receipt is for the county’s record
and the run for the record receipt gets sent to the State BOE. When that run is complete, the SD
card was taken out and send it to get verified. The verification process was done in a bi-partisan
manner. I was afforded the opportunity to be one of the verifiers one time. The verification
process involved us inserting the SD card into the computer and reading the votes off it. If the
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votes matched what we had on paper, the individual was clear to move to the next step. If not,
the programmer had to start all over again. The test decks contained as little as 12 ballots and as
much as 212 ballots. If there was a problem, you hoped you didn’t have the test deck with 212
ballots. If the ballots were kept in order, one could go through the receipt and the ballot to see
which one was missed. This was a long process that took days to complete and having to work
with flaws in the verification only made it worse. At one point, we were told to skip the first run
and go straight to the “run for the record” because of we were running behind. It helped that any
people who were programming the machines knew what they were doing, but they often would
disappear for a few hours and leave their machines. The BOE did hire workers with no
experience to help and they were the ones who frequently had issues with the programming and
preparing. I and the more experienced employees ended up having to take over for them half of
the time to speed up the process. I caught on quickly but many proceeded with caution.
My experiences with voting technology paved the way for my interest and adaptation of
this thesis. I am grateful to have had great exposure to election administration, voting
technology, and to the standards which are used to run elections. It is noteworthy to mention that
my experiences have opened up the opportunity for someone outside the organization to analyze
the operations of the SCBOE, but it is not a representation of every Board of Elections in the
United States. There are numerous factors that play a role in the administration of elections that
takes place within each county, some of which will be explored in this paper. From what I saw,
there are many things that could be improved upon at the Suffolk County Board of Elections. In
terms of election technology, there is no doubt that the technology needs to be updated. It is also
apparent that the standards applied to voting technology need to be re-evaluated. The people
programming these machines, should be knowledgeable about them, and in turn know how to
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catch inaccuracies in tabulation and programming. From what I saw, the SCBOE is run well.
There is little concern surrounded by the accuracy of the election results they produce. Beyond
the chaos that is within those four walls, the SCBOE is an example for other counties to follow
in their footsteps.
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Chapter 3: Quantitative Analysis on the Effects of Race on Voting Technology
Implementation
Quantitative analysis is the way by which variables can be examined to draw various
conclusions on both a micro and macro level. This chapter seeks to establish that race is
correlated to the advancement of election technology. This will be shown by analyzing counties
in the United States. Investigating the impact on the advancement of voting technology will
assist in uncovering the faults of election administration, some of which pertain to election
technology. Previous research, which is discussed below, provides sufficient reasons to believe
that race has an effect on the implementation and advancement of voting technology. This
chapter focuses on comprehensive research comparing the racial composition of counties to the
change implementation of voting technology over time.
3.1 Methodology
The challenges associated with election technology may not be fully due to the
hierarchical structure of government that consists of local governments, state governments, and
the federal government. The discrepancies seen across counties are partially tied to the citizens
who reside there. Research from Tomz and Van Houweling (2003) concludes that analysis of
county-level data from South Carolina and Louisiana shows a wide gap in voided ballots
between Black and white populations. This gap is correlated to the type of equipment these
groups used. The gap between white and Black voters was found to be between 4 and 6
percent.88 The voting technologies these authors analyzed were optical scanners and punch card
systems, which were the machines that faced much controversy after the 2000 Presidential
Election.89 At this point, there was little research in these particular areas of election technology
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and election administration. Similarly, little research has looked into the differences in racial
complexities or incomplexities on the precinct-level.90 Other research on this topic points to
similar results. Hanson evaluated this phenomenon in Palm Beach County and found a
correlation between the percentage of overvoting and the percentage of registered Black voters in
the county.91 On a similar note, this research was also expanded to the surroundings of Palm
Beach County. Herron and Sekhon (2001) found a similar phenomenon in Broward, Duval, and
Miami-Dade counties.92 Additionally, Fessesnden (2001) and Keating and Mintz (2001)
provided evidence that ballots that had to be rejected occurred more in black precincts compared
to white precincts.93
To combat this occurrence, Tomz and Van Houweling (2003) bring attention a possible
explanation for why this phenomenon occurred to Black populations in the states they analyzed.
Tomz and Van Houweling state, “By Preventing overvoting and making undervoting more
transparent and correctable, lever and DRE machines reduce the influence of fundamental
factors- socioeconomic status disadvantages, relative inexperience, and racial antagonism- that
might lead blacks to make mistakes or fail to correct them more often than whites.”94 There are a
number of different factors that impact how a voter internalizes the steps to cast their vote. Many
of these factors are most likely beyond the voter’s control. Although this research is from the
early 2000’s, it is important to highlight the those who were Black in the counties studied were
unable to cast their vote because of factors outside of the control of jurisdictions. In terms of
election administration, variables mentioned by Tomz and Van Houweling are uncontrollable,
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but the selection of voting machines used as well as the training of poll workers controllable by
the county Board of Elections. It is an imperative that each county government takes active steps
to address the challenges certain minority groups face when going to cast their vote at the polls.
The research conducted by these authors illuminates a fundamental issue. Every citizen,
no matter how their racial identity, should be able to cast their vote and not have their aptitude,
education level, or any other measure affect the result. Election administrations can address this
issue with voting technology and by using their resources to properly address inconsistencies in
the voting process. One limitation of the studies above is that they only looked at the residual
votes of Black voters and not any other minority group. I hypothesize that Black populations
within each county are not the only population that suffers from the lack of advancement of
election technology. Additionally, there is limited research dedicated to election technology in
today’s world, creating a question of how this phenomenon can be addressed. I seek to show,
through data analysis, that race is a prevalent issue in election administration today and that it
stretches far beyond the Black populations of each county. I will examine demographic groups
such as Asian Americans, Hispanics, Black and whites in the years of 2010 and 2018. I have
shown that the advancement of election technology is a lethargic process. A 10 year period
should be sufficient to see if change was implemented and if the results had an effect on the
voting process.
At the beginning of this paper, I discussed how the mechanisms created to help
administer elections are highly contingent on the resources provided to them by the different
levels of the United States government. Resources such as funds to help assist in the
administrating of elections are highly impacted by the individuals who reside in each county.
One way to measure this affect is looking at demographic data and analyzing the racial
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composition of each county. Data was gathered on the racial composition of each county in the
United States from the United States Census’ Report- Annual County Resident Population
Estimates by Age, Sex, and Hispanic Origins: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2019.95 Data on election
technology used by each jurisdiction was collected from Verified Voting, a non-partisan
organization that researches election administration.96 Analyzing this data will bring attention to
where the country is in terms of its advancement of voting technology and how the demographic
composition of each county affects such technological advancement. Using Microsoft Excel,
data was synthesized to make a number of different conclusions which will be presented in the
next section. By comparing the percentage of each minority to the advancement of over time
illuminates which counties are advancing and which counties are not. It can also lead to
correlations based on the relationship between counties whose percentage above and below the
national average to the phasing out of old voting technologies and to the number of voting
technologies each county has.
With any national data set, there are fallacies with aspects of the data. For example,
across the United States, states categorized the divisions of their state lines jurisdiction types
other than counties. This presented an unique challenge when merging the U.S. Census
demographic data with the voting technology data. To alleviate this challenge, any jurisdiction
that was not categorized as a county was excluded. For example, the state of Connecticut
categorically defined each geographic region as a county, but also as a town, village, etc. This
led to each county being counted twice and to undefined numerical data. In a similar realm,
counties that had data that was not recognized by the excel software was also removed from the
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data set. The state of Michigan had to be removed for this reason. Although a sizeable amount of
data had to be excluded, it does not have any significant effects on the results of this study. As
previously mentioned, there are over 3,000 counties in the United States. The attributes of these
counties are mimicked in other counties, allowing these differences to be taken into
consideration as a whole. It is also noteworthy to explain that the racial components of each state
and county on a grand scale are similar across the country. It is a common theme that cities are
more diverse, whereas rural towns are homogeneous in nature, often times having a majority of
white individuals.
As important as it was for the statistical analysis to account for the changes in voting
technology usage, it was as important to create an understanding of the demographic components
of each county. To calculate the national average, the regression used took the total for the
specific demographic (White, Black, Asian, and Hispanic) to the total population of each county.
The total population was calculated by adding the total female and male populations for each
demographic group. To calculate these raw data points as a percentage, the total demographic
was taken and divided by the total population for each perspective county to get the percentage
of each demographic group. This was done for both 2010 and 2018. The goal of this maneuver
was get an idea of where the country is in terms of its diversity. The reason why the percentages
add to more than 100% is due to the fact that the Hispanic demographic is not a racial category.
The U.S. Census states, “These standards generally reflect a social definition of race and
ethnicity recognized in this country, and they do not conform to any biological, anthropological,
or genetic criteria.”97 For the data analysis presented in this paper, the same reasoning the U.S.
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Census ureses mimics the rational for using Hispanics as a variable. The results of this regression
and regressions related to the national demographic will be presented in the next section.
Using the national average as a base point, the demographic composition was analyzed
for each state. The purchasing power of voting machines lies in the hands of counties. Due to
this, the demographic composition of each county can provide various insights to county
differences within a single state. To consolidate this approach, the highest and lowest averages
were looked at in order to understand how drastic the variance was. If there is little variance, it
would be plausible to assume that the number voting technologies would be similar per county.
On the other hand, counties with a significant percent range of each minority group, could see a
wide discrepancy of how many unique voting technologies are being used by majority white
counties compared to other counties which are a minority majority. This will allow conclusions
to be made on the county level.
The county level is not the only important measure being analyzed. As indicated before,
the delegation of election administration stems from the federal government down to state
governments. The state governments then further delegates this responsibility to local
jurisdictions. Analyzing the fluctuations in state demographics is important to understanding the
relationship between counties and their decisions acquire new voting technology. To represent
this idea, the average percent of each demographic group was taken for the years 2010 and 2018.
To make timely conclusions, a random sample of states was taken. Using a random number
generator, 10 different numbers were generated which related to the list of states in alphabetical
order. The states that were randomly selected were—Arkansas, California, Illinois, Maryland,
Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Oregon, Utah, and Wyoming. These states span the country and
provide sufficient differences in racial disparity and other factors such as population size.
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The methods to analyze voting technology trends involved much more manipulation.
With the voting technology data coming from two years, 2010 and 2018, voting technology
advancement trends became apparent. These trends were calculated by using a count of the
machine type, leading to the numbers 1,0, and -1 to represent the loss (-1), gain (1), or no change
(0) in the accumulation of voting technology. In order to see these trends, another regression was
used to take the difference between the data for the year 2018 and the year 2010. The voting
technologies with the most change were ballot marking devices, DRE touchscreens, batch-fed
optical scanners, and hand-counted paper ballots. The change on a state and county level was
interpreted by taking the average change over the two different years.
Due to the nature of the data, it became apparent that comparing the total white
percentages to each other variable percentage would lead to insignificant conclusions. The
percentages were too similar. This could be due to the fact that race identity is not
monochromatic and individuals more often than not identify as a singular demographic category.
For this reason, it would be most beneficial to analyze the total minority percentage. To get this
percentage, the Black, Asian, and Hispanic percentages were added together.
Before the results of this inquiry are shared, it is necessary to reiterate and share my
hypothesizes. I hypothesize that the counties that are more racially diverse are more likely to be
suffering from the lack of voting technology advancement. I also hypothesize that counties that
have a majority white population will see the most advancement over the eight year time period.
These sets of hypotheses set to provide evidence that the data will show a relationship between
demographic composition of the county and its advancement with voting technology.
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3.2 Results
The data collected and analyzed in this inquiry highlight important insights such as how
race correlates to the advancement of voting technologies. The way in which the data was
analyzed was done intentionally. The results are derived from correlations, comparing the
percentage of minority populations to the change or lack thereof for specific voting machines.
There are many factors that contribute to why or why not counties don’t have the newest, most
high-tech voting machines and it is for this reason that no monocausal argument can be made.
Some factors outside the scope of this research include socioeconomic status, size of the
county/jurisdiction, laws and statues regulating the electoral process, and the number of contests
in each given election. These factors are no doubt important and do in fact partake in the overall
explanation of the issues and challenges with advancing voting technology. Based on the
historical significance of race in voting laws and elections in a general context, it is most
important to analyze the effects race has on voting technology. More specifically, voting laws
like the 1965 Voting Rights Act provides sufficient reasoning to believe that there is a strong
correlation between race and aspects of election administration.
Regarding the demographic composition of each county and state, it is apparent that the
demographic of each jurisdiction fluctuated in interesting ways. The previous section previously
mentioned that 10 states out of the 50 U.S. states were randomly selected. Overall, the states
selected represent the country in terms of geographic region. The states chosen were Arkansas,
California, Illinois, Maryland, Nebraska, New York, Oregon, and Wyoming. Due to the
widespread nature of these states, it can be determined that these states are representative of all
states within the United States. The national averages, which incorporated every state minus any
county that had an error when matching the U.S. Census data to the voting technology data, was
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calculated for both 2010 and 2018. The white population increased by six percent from 2010 to
2018 while the average Black population dropped by one percent. Additionally, the Asian
national population average remained the same over the eight year period and the Hispanic
population average increased by one percent. When comparing the ten states chosen and their
demographic composition percentages to the national percentages for both years, it is determined
that each state isn’t drastically above or below the national average. Rather, in the case of the
white populations, these states were above the national average in both 2010 and 2018, below
the average in both years for the black population, and at or one percentage point off from the
national average for both the Hispanic and Asian populations. Out of the states selected, all of
them have total minority percentages below the national average. These comparisons are
represented in tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3. Significant conclusions can be drawn based on these
national averages. The results confirm the belief that the states selected correspond with other
states no matter if the state was selected for this study or not. Also, it formulates a specific
prediction. If the demographic population for the four race variables are similar to the national
average, then there should be little variance in the voting technology these states use. More
specifically, the number of voting machines used should be similar and to each other as well as
the phasing out of older voting technologies.
2010

2018

White

79%

85%

Black

10%

9%

Asian

1%

1%

Hispanic

9%

10%

Table 3.1 Representation of demographic composition of the United
States in terms of the four variables analyzed in 2010 and 2018.
Source: U.S. Census, Annual County Survey Results, 2019
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State

White

Black

Asian

Hispanic

Arkansas

81%

16%

1%

5%

California

84%

3%

5%

28%

Illinois

92%

5%

1%

4%

Maryland

78%

17%

3%

5%

Nebraska

96%

1%

0%

5%

Nevada

90%

2%

2%

15%

New York

89%

7%

2%

7%

Oregon

92%

1%

2%

10%

Utah

95%

1%

1%

8%

Wyoming

95%

1%

1%

8%

Table 3.2 Breakdown of the average percent composition of white, Black, Asian,
and Hispanic populations per each state for 2010.
Source: U.S. Census, Annual County Survey Results, 2019
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State

White

Black

Asian

Hispanic

Arkansas

80%

16%

1%

6%

California

85%

3%

6%

30%

Illinois

91%

5%

1%

5%

Maryland

75%

18%

4%

6%

Nebraska

95%

1%

1%

7%

Nevada

87%

2%

2%

17%

New York

87%

7%

3%

8%

Oregon

91%

1%

2%

12%

Utah

94%

1%

1%

9%

Wyoming

94%

1%

1%

9%

Table 3.3 Breakdown of the average percent composition of white, Black, Asian,
and Hispanic populations per each state for 2018.
Source: U.S. Census, Annual County Survey Results, 2019

The second part to this investigation was to analyze the implementation of new election
technology over the eight year period. Results from this regression show that ballot marking
devices (BMD’s), batch-fed optical scanners, DRE touchscreens, and hand counted paper ballots
underwent the most change over the eight year period, whether they were phased out or were newly
implemented. These results are logically coherent since older technologies, theoretically, should
be phased out and new technologies should be phased in. On a state level, the results of each state
analyzed were in tandem with each other. For ballot marking devices, seven of the ten states had
counties that eliminated this voting technology while the other three saw no change. For batch-fed
optical scanners, a majority of states added this voting technology to its repertoire from 2010 to
2018. Only one state, the state of Arkansas, had counties that phased batch-fed optical scanners
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out of use. DRE touchscreens were phased out by almost all the states analyzed. Counties within
the states of Maryland, Nevada, and Utah phased out this voting technology completely. Other
states such as New York and Oregon saw no change in its counties for this technology. Hand
counted paper ballots are considered the oldest technology used for voting. Logically, the
assumption that as time goes on, older voting technologies are removed from the voting process
while more advanced technologies are implemented, is not justified by the results. In all but three
states, counties didn’t change how they implemented hand-counted paper ballots. Only two states,
Arkansas and New York had counties that reduced the use of paper ballots.
Ballot

Batch-Fed

Minority

Marking

Optical

DRE

Percentage

Device

Scan

Touchscreen Paper Ballots

Total

State

Hand
Counted

Arkansas

12%

0%

-17%

96%

-19%

California

11%

-24%

19%

-62%

0%

Illinois

12%

-39%

3%

-59%

0%

Maryland

11%

0%

30%

-100%

0%

Nebraska

13%

-100%

2%

0%

0%

Nevada

11%

0%

88%

-100%

0%

New York

11%

-16%

31%

0%

-56%

Oregon

11%

-100%

0%

0%

0%

Utah

11%

0%

62%

-100%

0%

Wyoming

12%

-87%

4%

-13%

0%

-37%

22%

-34%

-8%

Average

Table 3.4 Categorization of each type of voting technology analyzed in terms of the
average percent gain or loss for each of the ten states.
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Average Change in Voting Technology from 2010-2018
Average
Wyoming
Utah
Oregon
New York
Nevada
Nebraska
Maryland
Illinois
California
Arkansas
-150%

-100%
-50%
0%
Hand Counted Paper Ballots
DRE Touchscreen

50%
Batch-Fed Optical Scan

100%
150%
Ballot Marking Device

Figure 3.1 Visual representing the data in table 3.4. This graph brings to life the real
change that occurred over the eight year time period.

Discussion
The manipulation of demographic and voting technology data brings significant insights
to how the factor of race correlates to the incorporation of new technology into the voting
process. Out of the ten states randomly selected, Nebraska had the highest total minority
percentage, making it an outlier in the dataset. Overall, the trend seems to be that states and
counties are phasing out more technology than they are implementing new technology. This is
not necessarily a negative impact, but it does deem some concern. By removing technology from
the voting process and not materializing new technology, it indicates that there may be a shift
relying less on multiple voting technologies by a majority of the counties analyzed in this study.
This could be due to a lack of resources, which is undoubtedly alarming. Counties with the
lowest minority percentage show the highest percentages of eliminating voting technology.
Overall, Nebraska and Oregon had all their counties phase out ballot marking devices completely
while the other counties didn’t see as much of a drastic change. This lends to the conclusion that
counties that race may not have a significant impact the counties means to shift ballot marking
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devices. It also points to the development that race is not the only variable to affect the
implementation of new voting technology.
Another interesting dimension of the data produced is the continued dependence on handcounted paper ballots. Of the counties looked at closely, all but the state of Arkansas kept this
technology in use. This is most likely due to their significance in recounting ballots and their
ability to be used with a number of different voting machines. The fact that Arkansas removed
hand-counted paper ballots from their arsenal of voting technologies is interesting based on the
general dependence on them in elections. Since all counties in Arkansas phased out handcounted paper ballots, it would be beneficial to further investigate the reasoning behind this
decision. Furthermore, the continued reliance on hand-counted paper ballots provides evidence
that the historical relevance of paper ballots being an old technology does not affect the
continued reliance on it. Nebraska had the highest minority percentage which was 13%,
experiencing the highest rate of phasing out of selected voting technologies at the highest rate.
Nebraska phased out two of their four voting technologies. On the other hand, for states that had
a total minority percentage below the national average, the phasing out and implementation of
new voting technologies more evenly divided. There was no clear direction as to if all the
counties gained or lost a specific technology.
The evidence points to the conclusion that race is somewhat correlated to a county’s
ability to incorporate new voting technologies, but there is no clear relationship between the
demographic composition of counties and the implementation of new voting technologies.
Sporadic results like these confirm that there is no one cause contributing to a counties ability to
advance voting technologies. Additionally, these results confirm the individualistic nature of the
implementation of voting technology. If the percent change over time correlated strongly to be
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similar like the demographic condition, there would be similar change across all voting
technologies looked at.
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Chapter 4: Conclusion
Election technology is instrumental to the administration of elections and to the essence
of democratic practices in the United States. It is the way by which citizens of different
backgrounds and beliefs elect officials to represent them in the government, allowing them to
have a say in the decisions that are made. The electoral process, on the surface level, appears to
be a seamless process with few faults. In this paper, I have shown that this perception is
misguided. Once a voter leaves their intent on a piece of paper, they have no control over how
their vote is transcribed. Additionally, reports by the media and what voters see on election day
is a snapshot of the election process. This narrow view open to the public leads to the false
perceptions held by many Americans.
Due to my experience at the Suffolk County Board of Elections, I am able to look past
these perceptions and notice the imperfect process of election administration. As an intern at the
SCOBE, I took part in many aspects of administering elections. My experiences are unique
considering I was an outsider to the process. Unlike the employees at the BOE, I was an intern
for six weeks in total. I focused on preparing for early-voting, programmed different types of
voting machines, processed absentee ballots, and researched New York State election law. As I
worked in these areas, I was able to see how the practices and processes to carry out these tasks
were outdated. I previously noted that when I was told to make the sign-in sheets for the poll
workers for early voting, I was told to do it by hand. I spent hours attempting to draw straight
lines and make it presentable when it could have been done on the computer in a matter of
minutes. This one example mirrors the bogged down mindset of election administration. If it
ain’t broke, don’t fix it. As a result, the culture of the SCBOE was stagnant. It wasn’t a
coincidence that those who worked there took advantage of the nature of the job. By not
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completing their job in a timely manner and by some employees not giving their best effort to the
cause, they added to the difficulties of running an election. Mistakes were often made leading to
the waste of time and resources, even though resources were always scarce. This is noteworthy
to bring attention to because it highlights the attitudes of those within the BOE and can help
explain why the overall architecture of election administration is the way it is. With the snapshot
of how things are ran at the BOE, I can only ponder about what occurs at other BOE’s across the
country.
My time spent programming voting machines led to my complex understanding of their
role in election administration. A voting machine’s objective is to translate voter intent into an
entity that can be counted. A machine that malfunctions or is programmed the wrong way can
fail at transcribing voter intent. If this happens, the fragilities of democracy are exposed. The
intricacies and time-consuming nature of programming and preparing voting machines made it a
tedious process, but mistakes were made and valuable time was misappropriated. Even though
many made minor mistakes along the way, it cannot be assumed that this did not have any effect
on election day. Safeguards were implemented to catch these mistakes, but there is still a
possibility that they could of gone unnoticed. It didn’t take very long to get the hang of things
and seasoned election workers were able to get through a number of machines a day. It was the
people who were efficient who made up the time that was lost. Workers hid in their office areas
because they knew that what they would be doing would be boring. Their lack of initiative with
this task was no doubt harmful to election preparations.
The study of election technology has been put on the backburner by presidential
administrations as well as by scholars and elected officials. Administrations have other pressing
matters, and election administration and voting technology is not on their radar. When it is a
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topic of discussion, those discuss campaign-finance issues and those running for candidacy.
Additionally, the media only focuses on the problems on election day and not the overall
process. When they came into the BOE and record two different segments, the administrators
talked about the challenges of processing thousands of absentee ballots, something that worried
voters. Not enough resources are dedicated to the study voting technology advancement and for
that reason, the lack of attention is a threat to democratic practices in the United States.
A historical perspective of voting technology is essential to understanding the
advancement of election technology and most importantly the temporal component of the
process. Douglas Jones provides a comprehensive timeline of the history of election technology.
From his perspective, one can understand how election technology evolved to what is known to
be today. It is also noteworthy to acknowledge that some of the oldest technologies are still in
use today such as the paper ballot. Furthermore, the timeline of advancement for some voting
technologies is hundreds of years, while for other types of technology it takes less time. This
may be due to a lack of emphasis on election technology or the lack of funds appropriated to this
area of study. Today, the most advanced technologies on the market are direct recording
electronic (DRE’s) voting machines, ballot marking devices, and optical scanners. Finally, the
implementation of voting technologies in a county is not aligned with the temporal component of
the advancement of voting technologies. Currently, “old technologies” are being used in many
counties. As previously mentioned, most technology is viable for a decade, and when many of
these technologies have been in use for longer than the recommended time period, it is
detrimental to the electoral process and threatens democracy.
The 2000 Presidential Election was a major wake up call to the United States
government, election officials, and the general public and proves today, that issues with voting
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technology are nothing new. In Palm Beach County, Florida, the Presidential Election was
decided by the Florida Supreme Court because it was too close of a race between Al Gore and
George W. Bush. For this election, Palm Beach County elected to use a new type of ballot which
resulted in mass confusion among voters. Many who intended to vote for Al Gore had their vote
misinterpreted, leading to Bush winning the election. The 2000 mishap shines an unfortunate
spotlight on how voting technologies can have unforeseen consequences on election outcomes.
In turn, the U.S. government responded to this disaster by passing the Help America Vote Act
enacted in 2002. This act targeted multiple issues in election administration such as election
technology and voter registration. For election technology, this act was the first act in decades
that provided strict guidelines for states to follow and required that each jurisdiction have a
voting machine for those who are disabled. This was to help provide the disabled voter with a
sense of privacy while they cast their vote. The federal government tied monetary funds to this
shift, giving jurisdictions the ability to purchase newer technologies. The HAVA required
counties to phase out punch card voting systems and lever voting systems, since they were a
source of problems in the 2000 election. Although legislation like the Help America Vote Act
was essential to bringing about significant change in the application of voting technology, it only
put a band-aid on a more serious problem. The HAVA is not a long-term solution to solve issues
pertaining to the advancement of voting technology.
A reason why the federal government can only have a small role in election
administration is due to the role of federalism in elections. Weinstein-Tull provides a thorough
review of election federalism and the conflicts and limitations endured by the levels of
government. The basis of Weinstein-Tull’s argument is that the three branches of government-federal, state, and local-- delegate tasks of election administration as ordered by the U.S.
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Constitution. The Election Clause gives states the right to run elections, but the federal
government has the power to oversee the states actions. Since the Elections Clause gives state
governments a considerable amount of power, states can do as they please without little
pushback from the federal government. Weinstein-Tull takes this argument further, arguing that
states “hyperfederalize” elections by delegating election administration to counties and other
localities. In theory, this hierarchal set-up should produce secure, unbiased, and reliable
outcomes in elections. That is not the case. Local jurisdictions are burdened to carry the weight
of elections and they do not have sufficient resources to ensure the reliability and accuracy of
elections. There are also other liability issues between state and local governments when it
comes to who is responsible for violations of statues and law. Overall, electoral federalism
diffuses responsibility between levels of government and aids in the challenges of election
administration.
Elections are in fact political. Elections are held for voters to pick who they would like to
see in public office. Elected officials advocate for their constituents on a number of different
issues. Besides the fact that elections are held by elected officials, the Help America Vote Act
was enacted by the elected officials voters put into office. The mechanism by which voters show
their intent is by using voting technology on election day, hence making it a part of the political
apparatus. In 2020, election technology became a front page issue that grabbed the attention of
many. During the 2020 election, President Trump and his allies made countless accusations
against Dominion Voting Systems Inc., claiming that the company flipped voted intended for
Trump and turned them into votes for Biden. It was also claimed that the company had ties to
ANTIFA and that the company fixed the election of Hugo Chávez. Dominion Voting Systems
Inc. filed a lawsuit against Rudy Giuliani and other allies of the former president arguing
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defamation. Dominion Voting Systems Inc. is a manufacturer of voting machines used by many
U.S. counties and the slandering of this company undermines the reliability and accuracy of the
voting machines they produce. This is a political problem because it undermines the electoral
process and the way Americans choose their representatives.
Based on everything previously discussed, it is apparent that elections are fragile and can
be affected by the most minor and “harmless” occurrences. What this examination questioned, as
a potential explanation for the variance of coting technology used by counties, is effects of the
demographic composition of a county on the county’s ability to advance their arsenal of voting
technology. This examination is based on the fact that there are a number of different legislation
that aimed to combat racial inequalities in voting, most notably the Voting Rights Act of 1964.
Additionally, research by Tomz and van Houweling and other scholars provides sufficient
arguments to conclude that race has a negative impact on use of voting technology in counties.
Research by these scholars focused on Black populations in select states and counties. The
research in this paper takes a broader approach to the issue. I hypothesized that the counties that
are more racially diverse are more likely to be suffering from lack of advancement in election
technology and that counties that are mostly composed of white voters will have the most
advancement of election technology over the eight year period. In order to test my hypothesis, I
took data from Verified Voting, a non-partisan think tank, and the U.S Census. The data was
then matched up to create a comprehensive dataset, allowing for a multitude of comparisons to
made. The results show no clear correlation between the racial composition of counties and their
advancement of voting technologies from 2010 to 2018. This may be contributed to the fact that
there is not one single cause that affects the advancement and implementation of voting
technology. This is somewhat reassuring because if race played a significant role in the
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advancement of election technology, the voting process would be biased and not be
representative of all people. Another important finding is that counties are phasing out
technology faster than they are implementing more advanced voting technologies. This is to
some extent a concern because it shows that counties may be lacking resources and are indirectly
threatening the reliability of elections. In terms of specific voting technologies, ballot marking
devices were used my states with counties composing mostly of white voters. This result
presupposes the conclusion that race plays a role in election technology, but the extent to which
it does is unknown.
The implications of this research represent the need for more research and more attention
to this area of study. The most research dedicated to election technology occurred after the 2000
Presidential Election. Since then, it has been twenty-one years since any significant amount of
attention given to this area of study. There needs to be more current research on this topic, since
technology in a general sense is advancing rapidly. Additionally, this research has connected
data on voting technology on a national scale to U.S. census data, opening up opportunity for
these comparisons to be made with a new perspective. This paper should not be the end of this
research, since only one factor that affects the advancement of voting technology was looked at.
As previously mentioned, there is no monocausal factor that affects this phenomenon. There is
much more research that needs to be done to get a full picture of how these factors affect voting
technology implementation and how these factors interact with each other.
Additionally, federal, state, and local governments need to make it a priority to work
together on election administration. The delegation of such power was done to recognize the
sovereignty of state governments, not because they felt that county localities are entitled to
administer elections. One way would be for the federal government to provide continued
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assistance to state and local governments through funding research on voting technology and
prescribing more resources to the Federal Election Commission and the Election Assistance
Commission. These groups are subjected to the power of the executive branch, and history has
shown that they have been disregarded under certain presidents. The federal government should
also provide more assistance to counties that are impoverished and disadvantaged in terms of
their funding and access to resources. The interactions between local and state governments
should not be one of tension. State governments ought to take some responsibility for the burden
states place on counties by delegating election administration to them. When legal challenges
arise, they should not put the blame on local governments. Instead, they should recognize their
role in assisting in the administration process and understand how they can ensure their state
carries out fair elections. If the federalist relationship between the three levels of government
change, the administration of elections would be carried out more equally across the country.
Free elections are what makes the United States a democracy. By putting them on the
backburner, we threaten their intended existence. In this paper, I have shown how fragile the
process is and what is at stake if we don’t actively work to improve voting technology. From my
experiences, Suffolk County (NY) worked diligently to conduct an election that survived the
hiccups along the way. It is not because of any law or because of the demographic composition
of the county, but rather the leadership of those elected to this office. The leadership of officials
in BOE’s across the U.S. are not the same which may add to this phenomenon. Voting
technology is the way by which voters express their intent. When they fail, the ability of voters
to express their choice is compromised, and in turn democracy is compromised. This research
shows that there are factors that affect the implementation and advancement of voting
technology, which need to be addressed. Government agencies, scholars, and voters ought to
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demand more oversight and insight into election technology in order to ensure that they represent
the people.
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Appendix A
Voting technology change over time for ballot marking devices, batch-fed optical scanners, DRE
touchscreen devices, and hand-counted paper ballots.
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